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Recent research has shown that ‘rich’ households save at much higher rates than
others (see Carroll (2000); Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (1996); Gentry and Hub-
bard (1998); Huggett (1996); Quadrini (1999)). This paper documents another large
diﬀerence between the rich and the rest of the population: portfolios of the rich are
heavily skewed toward risky assets, particularly investments in their own privately
held businesses. The paper explores three possible explanations of these facts. First,
perhaps there is exogenous variation in risk tolerance, so that highly risk tolerant house-
holds engage in high-risk, high-return activities, and the risk-lovers who are lucky con-
stitute the rich. A second possibility is that capital market imperfections al aGentry
and Hubbard (1998) and Quadrini (1999) require entrepreneurial activities to be largely
self-ﬁnanced, and these same imperfections imply that entreprenurial investment will
yield high average returns. The ﬁnal possibility is that wealth enters households’ util-
ity functions directly as a luxury good as in Carroll (2000) (one interpretation is that
this reﬂects the utility of anticipated bequests), implying that risk aversion declines
as wealth rises. The paper concludes that the overall pattern of facts suggests both
Carroll-style utility and Gentry/Hubbard-Quadrini style capital market imperfections
are important.
11 Introduction
Ever since the pathbreaking work of Pareto more than a century ago, economists have
known that wealth is extremely unevenly distributed. More recently, survey data have
revealed that portfolio structures are also very diﬀerent for households with diﬀerent
levels of wealth. While the portfolios of the rich are complex, the portfolio of ﬁnancial
and real assets of the median household (at least in the U.S.) is rather simple: a check-
ing/savings account plus a home and mortgage, and not much else.1 Overwhelmingly,
the data tell us that if we wish to understand aggregate portfolio behavior, it is critical
to understand the behavior of the richest few percent of households, both because they
control the bulk of aggregate wealth and because their portfolio behavior is much more
complex than that of the typical household.
Though the foregoing arguments may seem to provide a compelling rationale for
studying the portfolios of the rich, there has been little recent academic work in this
area. The goal of this paper is to provide a summary of the basic facts about portfolios
of wealthy households in the U.S. (and how the facts have changed over time) in a form
which allows comparison of their behavior both with the rest of the population in the
U.S. and with portfolio behavior among other groups and other countriessurveyed in
the recent volume Household Portfolios edited by Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2001
(Projected)), and to make a preliminary attempt to understand the characteristics that
will be required of any model which hopes to be consistent with the observed behavior.
The principal conclusion will be that the most important way in which the portfolios
of the rich diﬀer from those of the rest is that the rich hold a much higher proportion
of their portfolios in risky investments, with a particularly large concentration of net
worth in their own entrepreneurial ventures.
After the empirical conclusions are presented, the paper informally considers how
these results relate to theoretical models of portfolio behavior. The starting point
will be a standard stochastic version of the Life Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis
model. That model will prove inadequate, however, because it implies that the rich
should look like scaled-up versions of everybody else. They should have neither the
extreme wealth-to-income ratios observed in the data, nor the unusual portfolio struc-
tures. The goal of the theoretical discussion will be to consider whether any of three
potential modiﬁcations to the standard model might explain the observed combination
of facts.
The ﬁrst idea is that perhaps there is exogenous, immutable ex ante variation in
risk aversion across households.2 In that case more risk-tolerant households would
1Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2001) ﬁnd that the only kind of ﬁnancial asset held by more than
half of US households is a checking/transactions account.
2By ex ante we mean a preference diﬀerence which exists prior to any saving or portfolio choice
decision the household makes, and which is unaﬀected by the outcomes of such choices.
2take greater risks and on average would earn higher returns. If owning a private busi-
ness is the form of economic activity that oﬀers the highest risk and highest return,
one might expect that the most risk tolerant households would gravitate toward en-
trepreneurship, and on average would end up richer (though the failures might end
up poorer).3 The paper will argue that this story has several defects, ranging from
the fact that the empirical evidence fails to ﬁnd a correlation between wealth growth
and initial (expressed) risk aversion to the fact that, taken alone, the story provides
neither an explanation for the lack of diversiﬁcation of entrepreneurial investments nor
for the tendency of wealthy households to hold much of their net worth in their own
entrepreneurial ventures.
These points lead to the second possibility: that the observed patterns are entirely
a consequence of capital market imperfections, as suggested recently by Gentry and
Hubbard (1998) and Quadrini (1999). Those authors argue that adverse selection and
moral hazard problems require entrepreneurial enterprises to be largely self-ﬁnanced.
They further assume that there is a minimum eﬃcient scale for private enterprises
and that this minimum scale is large relative to the wealth of the typical household.
The combination of these two assumptions can explain why households with low or
moderate wealth or income are less likely to become entrepreneurs. Furthermore,
this story requires no diﬀerences in tastes among members of the population, and in
principle can explain both the high saving rates of the rich and the high portfolio shares
in their own entrepreneurial ventures. However, this story too has problems. The ﬁrst
is that, in the absence of diﬀerences in preferences between the rich and the rest,
the standard model implies that those households who have invested heavily in their
own entrepreneurial ventures should try to balance the riskiness of these investments by
holding all other assets in very safe forms. Instead, the non-entrepreneurial investments
of rich entrepreneurs are much riskier than the portfolios of nonrich nonentrepreneurs.
A second problem with this story is that even the model with imperfect capital markets
implies that as the rich get old, they eventually begin running down their wealth. In
contrast, empirical data reveal no evidence that wealthy elderly households ever begin
to run down their wealth.
The ﬁnal possibility is that the model’s assumption about the household utility
function needs to be changed in a manner similar to that proposed by Carroll (2000),
who simply assumes that wealth enters the utility function as a luxury good in a mod-
iﬁed Stone-Geary form. Because Max Weber (1958) argued that a love of wealth for
its own sake is the spirit of capitalism, Bakshi and Chen (1996) and Zou (1994) have
3Surprisingly, it is not clear that classical theory supports the proposition that less risk averse
individuals will invest a higher proportion of their risky investments in the most-risky activities.
See Gollier (2001) for a discussion of the ‘mutual fund separation theorem’ which implies that the
composition of risky assets should be similar whatever the level of risky asset holdings. We will assume
that this reﬂects a limitation of classical theory, rather than a plausible description of behavior.
3dubbed such models ‘capitalist spirit’ models. Carroll (2000) proposed this modiﬁca-
tion to the standard model as a way to explain the high lifetime saving rates of the rich,
and argued that many diﬀerent kinds of behavior, ranging from philanthropic bequest
motives to pure greed, would result in a formulation of saving behavior that would be
well captured by the modiﬁed model. An unanticipated consequence of the model is
that it implies that rich households have lower relative risk aversion than the nonrich,
which in turn could explain why the rich hold riskier portfolios than the rest, and why
high-wealth or high-income young households are more likely to begin entrepreneurial
ventures.
The one feature of the data that the ‘capitalist spirit’ model taken alone cannot
explain is the tendency of entrepreneurs to invest largely in their own entrepeneurial
ventures, which appears to require some form of capital market imperfection. The
paper thus concludes that the main features of the data can probably be explained in a
model which combines capital market imperfections of the kind emphasized by Gentry
and Hubbard (1998) and Quadrini (1999) with a utility function like that postulated
in Carroll (2000).
2T h e D a t a
2.1 Portfolios of the Rich
U.S. survey data on the portfolios of the rich are the best in the world. The 1962-
63 Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers (henceforth SFCC) was the ﬁrst
wealth survey to heavily oversample the richest households. The next comprehensive
wealth survey was the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, which was followed by a
1989 SCF which consisted of a subsample of reinterviewed households from the 1983
survey along with a fresh batch of new households. Since 1989 the SCF has been
performed triennially (though with no further panel elements), with the latest survey
having been completed in 1998.
The availability of data spanning such a long time period opens up the possibility
of studying how portfolios change in response to changes in the economic enviornment.
Before examining the data on portfolio structure, therefore, we ﬁrst present a summary
of the taxation and legal changes that we might expect to have had a substantial impact
on portfolio structure of wealthy households.
2.1.1 The Tax Environment
Table 1 summarizes the changes over time in the three aspects of US taxes that are
particularly important for the rich. (For information on broader changes in the US tax
code see the paper by Poterba (2001)). The ﬁrst two columns show the statutory top
4marginal federal tax rate, which declined from 91 percent in 1963 to 39.6 percent in
1993 and thereafter. The second column shows the actual taxes paid as a proportion of
their incomes by the richest one percent of households. In spite of the dramatic decline
in top marginal rates, the proportion of income paid in taxes has been fairly steady,
varying between around 20 and 25 percent over the entire period. This reﬂects the
fact that during the era of high top marginal rates, the tax code was riddled with tax
shelters and loopholes that made it possible for almost all rich people to avoid paying
the conﬁscatory top marginal rates on the statute books.
The estate tax is also highly relevant for the rich. The structure of the estate tax
is rather complex, but that structure remained largely the same over the period in
question. The ﬁrst $x of an estate is free from estate taxation altogether, where $x is
indicated by the column of the table labelled ‘exemption.’ Above $x, taxes begin at a
marginal rate of y percent and peak at a top marginal rate of z percent, where y and
z are the ﬁrst and second numbers in the column labelled ‘tax range.’
The exclusion for closely held businesses is a mechanism that reduces the reported
amount of the value of a closely-held business that is taxable, under the condition
that the heir plans to ‘actively manage’ the business rather than sell it. The marital
deduction indicates how much of the estate is taxed when one spouse dies and the
estate falls into the hands of the widow or widower. The 100 percent deduction since
1985 means that estates are taxed only when both members of a married couple have
died.
The ﬁnal kind of tax that is relevant to the rich is the gift tax exclusion amount
$g, whose value is reported in the last column of the table. This is the amount that
each member of the household (husband and wife) can give to any individual (son,
daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, grandchildren, etc.) annually without incurring
any additional taxes for the recipient or donor.
The table shows that there have been two big changes in the taxes speciﬁcally
relevant for the rich over the period in question: the large increase in exemption levels
for the estate tax in the early 1980s, and the more gradual, but cumulatively very large,
decline in top marginal rates. The most important change not captured in the table is
probably the abrupt termination of a variety of tax shelters in the 1986 tax reform.
A ﬁnal feature of the tax code that is relevant for the rich is the ‘step-up in basis
at death.’ The capital gains tax ‘basis’ for an asset is normally deﬁned as the nominal
price at which the asset was bought. However, if the asset has been inherited, then the
basis is the nominal valuation of the asset at the time it was inherited. The step up in
basis at death provides an incentive for individuals who anticipate leaving a bequest
whose value is less than the exemption amount to hold their assets in forms which yield
returns disproportionately in the form of capital gains, since capital gains that happen
before death are untaxed. (Incentives for the very rich to hold their assets in forms
which yield mainly capital gains are smaller because the capital gains do contribute
5to the valuation of the estate for tax purposes and thus are marginally taxed at the
marginal estate tax rate for those who will leave bequests in excess of the exemption
amount).
Implications of the tax system for the portfolio structure of the rich are not al-
ways easy to determine by examining statutory provisions. For example, the incentive
provided by the ‘step up in basis at death’ to hold assets in forms that yield capital
gains depends importantly on the eﬀective marginal rate of taxation on other forms of
capital income, which (as discussed above) is not very well proxied by the statutory
top marginal rate. The exclusion for closely held businesses does provide an incentive
to hold at least a limited absolute amount of the portfolio in the form of closely-held
businesses if the individual expects his or her heirs to continue to run the business.
However, no marginal incentive to further business ownership is provided once the
total amount of wealth held in this form exceeds the exclusion amount. For a more
detailed historical analysis of tax policies relevant for the rich in the postwar period,
see Brownlee (2000).
2.1.2 Detailed Portfolio Structure
Our statistical summary of the portfolio structure of the rich begins with Table 2,
which provides data on the proportion of the rich (deﬁned here and henceforth as the
top one percent of households by net worth) who own any amount of various kinds of
assets.
Perhaps the most dramatic change over time in the table is the sharp increase in
the proportion of households with deﬁned contribution pension plans. In the 1962-63
SFCC, only 10.1 percent of the rich had any such account, but by 1983 the fraction had
already jumped to 65.6, while by 1995 the fraction had reached 78.6 percent. The low
percentage in 1962-63 reﬂects the fact that there was little tax advantage to such plans
until the early 1980s, when Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) suddenly became
available in principle to the whole population, and eligibility for company-based 401(k)
pension plans was greatly expanded. What is interesting is the speed with which rich
households availed themselves of these new options. In contrast, Bertaut and Starr-
McCluer (2001) show (Table 3) that only 31 percent of all households had acquired
such accounts by the time of the 1983 survey.
Another notable change is that the proportion holding individual stock shares di-
rectly has fallen from 84.0 percent in 1962 to 65.0 percent in 1995, while the proportion
holding mutual funds has risen from about 24 percent to about 45 percent. This re-
ﬂects a broad pattern in which households have increasingly decided to hold shares in
the form of mutual funds rather than individual stocks. This pattern has not been
much studied by economists, although it is interesting because it reﬂects a convergence
of actual behavior toward portfolio theory’s recommendation for diversiﬁcation.
6Among the other categories of assets, the largest changes are seen in the holdings of
‘other bonds’ (primarily corporate bonds), which declined very sharply between 1962
and 1983 and ﬂuctuated substantially between 1983 and 1995. Because nominal interest
income is taxable annually while capital gains are taxable only upon realization, the
sharp increase in nominal interest rates caused by the acceleration of inﬂation in the
1960s and 1970s could explain a shift out of interest-bearing assets between the 1963
and 1983. However, there is no obvious tax reason for the ﬂuctuations between 1983
and 1995.
The proportion of the richest households who have equity in a privately held busi-
ness has ﬂuctuated substantially over the years, from a low of 69.0 percent in 1962-63
to a high of 88.0 percent in 1983. To some extent, ﬂuctuations in this variable may
reﬂect stock market valuations, because after a large increase in stock prices a higher
proportion of the wealthy will be rich because of their stock holdings compared with
the proportion who are rich because of their holdings of other kinds of assets. (The
1983 SCF was conducted before the bull markets of the 80s and 90s had boosted stock
valuations.)
With respect to debt holdings, the proportion of rich households with any debt
jumped sharply between the 1962-63 SFCC, when it was 50.2 percent, and the 1983
SCF, when it was 77.9 percent, but exhibited no clear trend thereafter. Among debt
categories, the most striking change is the increase in the proportion of households with
mortgage debt, from 30.7 percent in 1962 to 52.5 percent in 1995. This likely reﬂects
the fact that mortgage interest remained tax deductible after the 1986 tax reform while
other forms of debt lost their deductible status.
On the whole, the striking feature of this table is that the proportion of rich house-
holds owning various categories of assets has not changed greatly for most categories of
assets - particularly considering that small sample sizes mean that there is inevitably
some measurement error in the statistics for any particular year.4
Another useful comparison is of the rich to the rest of the population. Average
values of ownership shares for the nonrich over the ﬁve survey years are presented
in the last column of the table. The broadest observation to make here is that rich
households are more likely to own virtually every kind of asset. Particularly striking
is the discrepancy in the proportion owning equity in a privately held business, which
averages about 75 percent for the rich but only 13 percent for the rest of the population.
The contrast in ownership of shares in publicly traded companies is only slightly less
dramatic: 74 percent versus 16 percent.
Table 3 examines the relative weight of various kinds of assets in the net worth of
4One exception is ‘other ﬁnancial assets,’ which had an 89.3 percent owernship rate in the 1962-63
SFCC but much lower rates in the later surveys. This is almost certainly because holdings of cash
were included in this grab-bag category in the SFCC but not in the SCF’s. In any case, the next table
shows that ‘other ﬁnanical assets’ constitute a trivial proportion of net worth in all surveys.
7the richest households. The table shows that the shift in value from stocks to mutual
funds was substantial, but even at the end of the sample in 1995, total net worth in
individual shares still remained substantially greater than that in mutual funds. One
of the largest shifts over time is in the role of investment real estate, which jumps from
7.4 percent of net worth in 1962-63 to over 20 percent in 1983. Investment real estate
continues to constitute more than 20 percent of the portfolio until 1995, when its share
drops to 13.1 percent. The jump in investment real estate between the early 1960s and
the early 1980s may reﬂect the prominent role of real estate in tax shelters until the
tax reform act of 1986. One would have expected a decline in the value of investment
real estate following the repeal of many of these tax shelters in the 1986 tax act, so it
is surprising that no decline is manifest until 1995.
Another interesting observation from the table is the small amount of mortgage
debt (only 1.1 percent of net worth on average) despite the fact that more than half of
the rich have positive amounts of such debt.
Comparing the rich to the rest of the population, again perhaps the most important
diﬀerence is the importance of business equity for the rich. Such wealth accounts for
about 40 percent of total net worth of the rich in 1983 and thereafter, vastly more than
its share in the net worth of the typical household. Other diﬀerences include the lower
total indebtedness of the rich and the much smaller proportion of total wealth tied up
in home equity.
2.1.3 Portfolio Structure And Portfolio Theory
The usual theoretical analysis of portfolio allocation considers the optimal proportion
of net worth to invest in ‘risky’ versus ‘safe’ assets. This stylized theoretical treatment
is conceptually useful but diﬃcult to bring to data, because it is hard to allocate every
asset to one of these two categories. Table 4 reﬂects an eﬀort to ﬁnd a compromise
between the complexity of actual portfolios and the simplicity of theory.
Among ﬁnancial assets, there are some that are clearly safe (like checking, saving,
and money-market accounts) and some that are clearly risky (like stock shares). But
other assets are harder to allocate, either because the item itself has an ambiguous
status (like long-term government bonds, which are subject to inﬂation risk but not
repayment risk (we hope!)) or because the asset is a composite with unknown propor-
tions of risky and safe assets (like mutual funds which hold both stocks and government
bonds). We have allocated all ﬁnancial assets to one of three categories: Clearly safe,
fairly safe, and risky, which can of course be further aggregated into broad measures of
safe and risky assets. We have divided nonﬁnancial assets into the primary residence,
investment real estate, business equity, vehicles, and ‘other.’
With these deﬁnitions, we can construct three deﬁnitions of risky assets: A ‘narrow’
deﬁnition, which includes only risky ﬁnancial assets; a ‘broad’ deﬁnition, which includes
8clearly and fairly risky ﬁnancial assets, business equity, and investment real estate; and
a ‘broadest’ deﬁnition which adds even the ‘fairly safe’ assets.
It is apparent from the table that the portfolios of the rich are dramatically more
risky than those of the rest of the population.5 Across the ﬁve surveys the proportion of
their portfolios that consisted of broadly risky assets was about 80 percent, compared
with an average percentage of only 40 percent for the nonrich households. Examining
the data in more detail reveals two key diﬀerences between the rich and the rest:
the rich hold a much smaller proportion of their wealth in home equity6 (7.4 percent
versus 49.6 percent) and a much larger proportion in business equity and investment
real estate (the sum of these two categories is 52.1 percent for the rich versus 26.2
percent for the rest).
2.1.4 Portfolio Diversiﬁcation and Age Structure
Another perspective on the portfolios of the rich is presented in Table 5, which provides
a census of the portfolio structure of the rich along the three dimensions corresponding
to ownership or non-ownership of clearly safe, fairly safe, and risky assets, a total of
23 = 8 diﬀerent possibilities. In all ﬁve survey years, a majority or nearly a majority of
the rich held some assets in each of these three categories. This is a sharp contrast to
the behavior of the rest of the population, which is much more evenly distributed among
the 8 categories but is most heavily concentrated in the region with only safe assets.
(See Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2001) for the data on the rest of the population.)
Finally, Table 6 presents data on ownership rates for risky assets by age of the
household head for each of the survey years.7 Interestingly, the patterns for ownership
rates and for portfolio shares are diﬀerent: The probability of owning at least some
amount of risky assets is monotonically increasing in age, but the proportion of the
portfolio composed of ‘broad risky’ assets rises through the ﬁrst three age categories
(up to age 49) but exhibits no clear pattern across the older age groups.8 Ownership
rates of ‘risky’ assets show a similar monotonic increase (at least until age 70+), while
the portfolio share shows some tendency to decline with age. As King and Leape (1984)
argue, the monotonic increase in ownership rates may reﬂect the accumulation of ex-
perience with diﬀerent assets as the household ages. The reduction in the ‘risky’ share
5One might wonder whether the diﬀerences in risky shares partly reﬂect age diﬀerences between
the rich and the rest. However, when the age range for the rich and the rest is restricted to households
aged 35-54, the divergence between the rich and the rest is, if anything, even greater. For example, the
portfolio share of private business for the age 35-54 rich is 47.6 versus 17.9 for the age 35-54 nonrich
- a greater discrepancy than the 37.7 versus 14.8 ﬁgures in Table 4.
6Home equity is calculated as the value of primary residence minus mortgage debt.
7Portfolio shares are for the whole population of the rich, not just for those who own risky assets,
i.e. the numbers are not conditional on participation.
8It is important to recall that these ﬁgures may reﬂect the eﬀects of both cohort and time eﬀects
as well as age eﬀects, so the true age eﬀects may diﬀer from the reported numbers.
9of the portfolio for the 50+ age groups is interesting because it corresponds roughly
to the common ﬁnancial advice to shift assets away from risky forms as retirement ap-
proaches (though admittedly no such pattern is evident for the ‘broad risky’ portfolio
share). Note, however, that there is some debate about whether this advice is theoret-
ically sound; furthermore, as shown by the comparative analysis of age proﬁles of risky
investment in several countries in Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2001 (Projected)),
there does not seem to be a consistent pattern to age proﬁles of the risky portfolio
share across countries.
2.1.5 International Evidence on Portfolios of the Rich
Evidence about portfolios of the rich in other countries is presented in Table 7.The data
in this table were provided by the respective country experts who contributed country
chapters to the Household Portfolios conference volume referenced in the bibliography.
Before describing the results, it is important to emphasize the problems associated
with such international comparisons. Probably the greatest problem is that surveys in
other countries generally have not made such an intense eﬀort as the SCF does to get
a large and representative sample of the very richest households; furthermore, little is
known about exactly how participation rates for the wealthy vary across countries. As
a result, a table merely presenting data from the top 1 percent of surveyed households
across countries might well reﬂect diﬀerences in survey success and methodology more
than actual diﬀerences in behavior across countries. Our response to this problem is
twofold. First, rather than focusing on the top 1 percent, where the variation in par-
ticipation rates is likely to be very large across countries, we report information about
the top 5 percent of households. Second, we strongly discourage direct comparison of
portfolio statistics for the ‘rich’ across countries. Instead, it seems likely to be more
reliable simply to examine how the diﬀerences between the rich and the rest vary across
countries.
Other survey diﬀerences also hamper international comparisons. From the stand-
point of comparing the results to the predictions of portfolio theory, we would like to be
able to divide all assets between safe and risky categories. Unfortunately, the problems
in making such allocations are even greater in most other surveys than they are in the
SCF. In particular, most surveys collect little or no information about the investment
strategies of mutual funds or deﬁned contribution pensions, or about the risk charac-
teristics of other ﬁnancial assets. Given these problems, we concluded that the most
informative feasible exercise was to allow individual country experts to determine, for
each asset category, whether there was suﬃcient information about that category to
allocate the asset unambiguously to one of the four levels of riskiness. If not, the ana-
lyst was asked to include the asset in the category ‘risk characteristics unknown.’ An
example in the SCF would be a mutual fund which the respondent indicated invested
10in both stocks and bonds. Because the SCF does not collect any information about
the proportion of the fund’s value invested in each of these two categories, we included
all such mutual fund assets in the ‘risk characteristics unknown’ category.9 Under
this strategy, at least the reader can be conﬁdent that the assets included in, say, the
‘clearly risky’ category are indeed all risky.
A ﬁnal problem is in normalization. Portfolio theory yields predictions about the
proportion of the portfolio that should be held in various kinds of assets. Accordingly,
table 7 reports the ratio of various kinds of nonﬁnancial assets and debts to total
net worth. It is very important to remember, however, that all of the measurement
problems that aﬀect the components of net worth also aﬀect the total. For example,
the net value of private business is not measured in the German survey data, and
consequently is not included in net worth. Furthermore, the German survey does not
provide separate data for the value of the respondent’s home and the value of all other
real estate owned by that respondent, so the number reported in the table for ‘private
residence’ actually reﬂects all real estate. Since private business wealth constitutes at
least 30 percent of total net worth of the rich in the three countries for which survey data
on these components of wealth do exist, and investment real estate is around another 15
percent of net worth, the apparently surprising ﬁnding that the gross value of ‘private
residence’ constitutes 88 percent of net worth for the ‘rich’ German households should
not be taken at face value.
Keeping all of these problems in mind, a few conclusions still seem warranted.
The most important is probably that in every country the top 5 percent hold a
substantially larger proportion of their ﬁnancial assets in risky forms than do the rest.
The diﬀerence is smallest in the UK, which may reﬂect the residual eﬀects of the large-
scale privatization of the Thatcher years and more recently the demutualization of
many formerly cooperative ﬁnancial enterprises. 10
Another result common to all countries is that the ratio of debt to net worth is
substantially smaller for the rich than for the rest, although the disparity is enormous
in some countries (the US) and rather small in others (Italy).
A striking diﬀerence across countries is in the breakdown of wealth between ﬁnancial
and nonﬁnancial forms. The two extremes are the US and Italy. The ratio of nonﬁnan-
cial to ﬁnancial wealth for the top 5 percent in the US is about 1.5, while that ratio in
Italy is approximately 7. Similar, though less extreme, results hold for the bottom 95
percent of households (where measurement problems are probably somewhat smaller).
The Italian country authors indicate that part of the discrepancy probably reﬂects
9This contrasts with our strategy in Table 4, where we divided such investments 50-50 between
the ‘fairly safe’ and ‘fairly risky’ categories.
10Shares were distributed to depositors, and thus many lower-income households who otherwise
owned no shares became shareowners. Research has shown that many lower-wealth households have
simply held onto the shares they obtained through demutualizations.
11systematic severe underestimation of ﬁnancial assets in Italy. Nonetheless, while the
maginitude of the diﬀerence may be mismeasured, qualitatively the observation that
nonﬁnancial assets are much more important in Italy than the US is probably true.
A ﬁnal observation is that there are large diﬀerences in the levels of debt held by
the bottom 95 percent across countries, ranging from a high of $36,000 in the US to
a low of only 4290 euro in Italy. This observation reinforces existing research which
has found that more highly developed ﬁnancial markets in the US have allowed much
higher levels of borrowing.11
3A n a l y s i s
It is now time to begin trying to understand the underlying behavioral patterns which
give rise to the data reported above. We start by presenting a baseline formal model
of saving over the life cycle, to which we will add a portfolio choice decision.
3.1 The Basic Stochastic Life Cycle Model
The following model is what I will henceforth characterize as the basic stochastic life






where u(C) is a constant relative risk aversion utility function u(C)=c1−ρ/(1 − ρ), β
is the (constant) geometric discount factor, and Dt,s =
s−1
h=t(1−dh) is the probability
that the consumer will not die between periods t and s (Dt,t is deﬁned to be 1; dt is
the probability of death between period t and t +1 ) .
The maximization is of course subject to constraints. In particular, if, following
Deaton (1991), we deﬁne Xt as ‘cash-on-hand’ at time t, the sum of wealth and current
income, then the consumer faces a budget constraint of the form
Xt+1 = Rt+1St + Yt+1
11Italy is a particularly interesting case. Until recently, the minimum down payment on a home
mortgage in Italy was on the order of 50 percent, while 5 percent down payment mortgages have been
common in the U.S. for at least a decade. Furthermore, the legal system in Italy makes reposession of
property extremely diﬃcult and time consuming. Thus, many Italians cannot aﬀord to buy a house,
and those who do buy end up borrowing much less. The high value of nonﬁnancial assets (mainly
housing wealth) relative to ﬁnancial is probably largely attributable to these features of the Italian
ﬁnancial system.
12where St = Xt−Ct is the portion of last period’s resources the consumer did not spend,
Rt+1 is the gross rate of return earned between t and t +1 ,a n dYt+1 is the noncapital
income the consumer earns in period t +1 .
Assume that the consumer’s noncapital income in each period is given by their
permanent income Pt multiplied by a mean-one transitory shock, Et[˜  t+1] = 1, and
assume that permanent income grows at rate Gt between periods, but is also buﬀeted
by a mean-one shock, Pt+1 = Gt+1Ptηt+1 such that Et[˜ ηt+1] = 1, where our notational
convention is that a variable inside an expectations operator whose value is unknown
as of the time at which the expectation is taken has a ∼ over it.
Given these assumptions, the consumer’s choices are inﬂuenced by only two state
variables at a given point in time: the level of the consumer’s assets Xt and the level of
permanent income, Pt. As usual, the problem can be rewritten in recursive form with
a value function Vt(Xt,P t). Written out fully in this form, the consumer’s problem is




Vt+1( ˜ Xt+1, ˜ Pt+1)

such that (2)
St = Xt − Ct
Xt+1 = Rt+1St + Yt+1
Yt+1 = Pt+1 t+1
Pt+1 = GtPtηt+1
3.2 The Saving Behavior of the Rich
Within the last decade, advances in computer speed and numerical methods have ﬁnally
allowed economists to solve life cycle consumption/saving problems like that presented
above with serious uncertainty and realistic utility (see, in particular, Hubbard, Skin-
ner, and Zeldes (1994); Huggett (1996); Carroll (1997); and the references therein). I
have argued elsewhere (Carroll (1997)) that the implications of these models ﬁt the
available evidence on the consumption/saving behavior of the typical household rea-
sonably well, certainly much better than the old Certainty Equivalent (CEQ) models
did.
However, another ﬁnding from this line of research has been that the model is unable
to account for the very high concentrations of wealth at the top of the distribution.
133.2.1 How Rich Are They?
Figure 1 shows the ratio of wealth to permanent income12 by age for the population as
a whole and for the households in the richest one percent by age category from the 1992
and 1995 SCFs. Also plotted for comparison is the level of the wealth to income ratio
at the top 1 percent implied by a standard life cycle model of saving similar to that in
Carroll (1997) or Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994). (Speciﬁcally, it is the Carroll
model with HSZ ‘baseline’ parameter values). The richest one percent are much richer
than implied by the life cycle model. In addition, the ﬁgure plots the age proﬁle of
the 99th percentile that would be implied by the HSZ model if it were assumed that
households do not discount future utility at all. The ﬁgure shows that even with such
patient households, the model remains far short of predicting the observed wealth to
income ratios at the 99th percentile.13
This ﬁnding is reconﬁrmed in a recent paper by Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999),
who do a very careful job of modelling pension arrangements, tax issues, and other
institutional details neglected in Carroll (2000) and also ﬁnd that the wealth-to-income
ratios at the top part of the income distribution are much greater than predicted by a
life cycle dynamic stochastic optimization model, even with a time preference rate of
zero.
3.2.2 How Do They Spend It All?
They don’t.
In the 1989, 1992, and 1995 SCFs, households were asked whether their spending
usually exceeds their income, and whether their spending exceeded their income in the
previous year. In order to run down their wealth, households obviously must eventually
spend more than their income. Yet only ﬁve percent of the rich elderly households in
the SCF answered that their spending usually exceeded their income.
More evidence is presented in Figure 2, which shows the levels of wealth by age
for the elderly in the 1992 and 1995 SCFs. There is no evidence in this ﬁgure that
wealth is declining for this population; indeed, if anything it seems to be increasing,14
consistent with the answers that the rich elderly give to the questions about whether
they are spending more than their incomes. The implication is that most of the wealth
which we observe them holding will still be around at death. This is clearly a problem
for any model in which the only purpose in saving is to provide for one’s own future
12SCF respondents are asked whether their total income this year was above normal, about normal,
or below normal. Following Friedman (1957), I deﬁne permanent income as the level of income the
household would normally receive.
13This ﬁgure is reproduced from Carroll (2000).
14This is in eﬀect a smoothed proﬁle of wealth by age adjusted for cohort eﬀects; see Carroll (2000)
for methodological details.
14consumption.
This crude evidence is backed up by a study by Auten and Joulfaian (1996) which
ﬁnds that the elasticity of bequests with respect to lifetime resources is well in excess of
one (their point estimate is 1.3). See Carroll (2000) for a summary of further evidence
that, far from spending their wealth down, the rich elderly continue to save.
3.3 Adding Portfolio Choice
Recently, a wave of papers (Bertaut and Halaissos (1997); Fratantoni (1998);Gakidis (1998);
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (1998); and Hochgurtel (1998)) has examined the pre-
dictions of stochastic life cycle models of the kind considered above when households
facing labor income risk are allowed to choose freely between investing in a low-return
safe asset and investing in risky assets parameterized to resemble the returns yielded
by equity investments in the past.
The only modiﬁcation to the formal optimization problem presented above nec-
essary to allow portfolio choice is to designate Rt+1 as the portfolio-weighted return,
which will depend on the proportion of the portfolio that is allocated to the safe and
the risky assets, and on the rate of return on the risky asset between t and t +1. C al l
the proportion of the portfolio invested in the risky asset (‘stocks’) ws,t (where w is
mnemonic for the portfolio ‘weight’), and (1 − ws,t) is the portion invested in the safe
asset. If the return on stocks between t and t+1isRs,t+1, the portfolio-weighted return
on the consumer’s savings will be R(1 − ws,t)+Rs,tws,t.
However, even without solving a model of this type formally, it is clear that such
models will not be able to explain the empirical diﬀerences between the portfolio be-
havior of the rich and the behavior of the rest of the population, because when the
utility function is in the CRRA class, problems of this type are homothetic. That
is, there is no systematic diﬀerence in the behavior of households at diﬀerent levels
of lifetime permanent income. Hence, such models provide no means to explain the
very large diﬀerences between the rich and the rest in saving and portfolio behavior
documented above.
3.4 Three Possible Modiﬁcations
There are at least three ways one might consider modifying the model in hopes of
explaining the apparent nonhomotheticity of saving and portfolio behavior.
3.4.1 Heterogeneity in Risk Tolerance
The ﬁrst is simply to allow for exogenous, immutable ex ante heterogeneity in risk
tolerance across members of the population. Formally, rather than assuming that
15all households have the same value of ρ, we can assume that each household has an
idiosyncratic, speciﬁc ρi.
The eﬀect of this would be to allow households with low values of ρ (high risk
tolerance) to choose highly risky but high-expected-return portfolios. On average, the
risk-tolerant households would be rewarded with higher returns and would therefore end
up richer than the rest of the population. Thus, the rich would be disproportionately
risk-lovers, and would therefore have riskier portfolios than the rest. As shorthand, I
will call this the ‘preference heterogeneity’ story henceforth.
3.4.2 Capital Market Imperfections
A second possibility is to follow Gentry and Hubbard (1998) and Quadrini (1999) in
assuming that there are important imperfections in capital markets which 1) require
entrepreneurial investment to be largely self-ﬁnanced; 2) imply that entrepreneurial
investment has a higher return than investments made on open capital markets; and 3)
require a large minimum scale of investment. As those authors show, the combination
of these three assumptions can yield an implication that portfolios of higher wealth or
higher income households will be much more heavily weighted toward entrepreneurial
investments, and that rich households with business equity have higher than average
saving rates (under the further assumption that the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution is high which means that they take advantage of the high returns that are
available to them by saving more). I will refer to this theory as the ‘capital market
imperfections’ story.
3.4.3 Bequests as a Luxury Good
A ﬁnal possibility is to change the assumption about the lifetime utility function.






Carroll (2000) shows that if one assumes that α<ρthen wealth will be a ‘luxury
good’ in the sense that as lifetime resources rise, a larger proportion of those resources
is devoted to ST. In the limit as lifetime resources approach inﬁnity, the proportion of
15It might seem that a ‘joy of giving’ bequest motive and a ‘dynastic bequest motive’ of the type
considered by Barro (1974) would be virtually indistinguishable, but it turns out that there are
several important diﬀerences. For example, the dynastic bequest model collapses to a standard life
cycle model for households with no oﬀspring, yet empirical evidence suggests that the rich childless
elderly continue to save. See Carroll (2000) for more arguments that the ‘joy of giving’ bequest motive
ﬁts the data better.
16resources devoted to the bequest approaches 1. The other salient feature of the model
is that if γ>0 there will be a ‘cutoﬀ’ level of lifetime resources such that households
poorer than the cutoﬀ will leave no bequest at all. Thus the model is capable of
matching the crude stylized fact that low-income people tend to leave no bequests, and
also captures the fact (from Auten and Joulfaian (1996)) that among those who leave
bequests, the elasticity of lifetime bequests with respect to lifetime income is greater
than one.
In this paper the assumption is that one receives utility from the contemplation of
the potential bequest in proportion to the probability that death (and the bequest)
will occur. Thus Bellman’s equation is modiﬁed to




Vt+1( ˜ Xt+1, ˜ Pt+1)

+ dtB(St),
and the transition equations for the state variables are unchanged.
While it is obvious how this model might help to explain the high saving rates of
the rich, it is not so obvious why it might help explain the high degree of riskiniess
of their portfolios. It turns out, however, that precisely the same assumption which
implies that bequests are a luxury good also implies that households are less risk-averse
with respect to gambles over bequests than with respect to gambles over consumption.16
That assumption is that the exponent on the utility-from-bequests function α must
be less than the exponent on the utility from consumption ρ. This implies that the
marginal utility from bequests declines more slowly than the marginal utility from
consumption and thus as wealth rises more and more of it is devoted to bequests
rather than consumption. However, the traditional interpretation of exponents like ρ
and α in utility functions of this class is as coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion, so the
assumption that bequests are a luxury good has the immediate implication of less risk
aversion with respect to bequest gambles than consumption gambles!
Following Max Weber as recently interpreted by Zou (1994) and Bakshi and Chen (1996),
I will henceforth call this the “Capitalist Spirit” model.
3.5 Distinguishing the Three Models
All of these theories can in principle explain the basic facts that the portfolios of the
rich are disproportionately risky and that investments in closely-held businesses are a
disproportionate share of the portfolios of the rich. This section attempts to distinguish
between the three theories on the basis of other kinds of evidence.
We begin with some direct evidence that there are substantial diﬀerences in the
risk preferences of the rich compared with the rest of the population. Table 8 reports
16The presence of the γ term in B(S) implies increasing relative risk aversion as bequest gambles get
larger. However, this does not alter the fact that risk aversion with respect to gambles over bequests
is always less than risk aversion with respect to gambles over consumption.
17the results of a direct question SCF respondents are asked about their risk tolerance.
Speciﬁcally, the respondents are asked
Which of the statements on this page comes closest to the amount of ﬁnancial
risk that you (and your [husband/wife/partner]) are willing to take when you
save or make investments?
1. TAKE SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL RISKS EXPECTING TO EARN SUB-
STANTIAL RETURNS.
2. TAKE ABOVE AVERAGE FINANCIAL RISKS EXPECTING TO EARN
ABOVE AVERAGE RETURNS.
3. TAKE AVERAGE FINANCIAL RISKS EXPECTING TO EARN AVER-
AGE RETURNS.
4. NOT WILLING TO TAKE ANY FINANCIAL RISKS.
For 1992 and 1995, the table reports the mean values of the response and the
percent of households reporting that they are not willing to take any ﬁnancial risks, by
permanent income and net worth percentile.17 The table shows that occupants of the
highest permanent income and net worth brackets are notably more likely to express a
willingness to accept above-average risk in exchange for above-average returns. Even
more dramatic is the diﬀerence between the proportion of the rich and of the rest who
express themselves as ‘not willing to take any ﬁnancial risks.’ Among the richest 1
percent by wealth, less than ten percent express such extreme risk aversion; among the
bottom 80 percent, nearly half express this sentiment.
Although economists have traditionally dismissed answers to survey questions of
this type as meaningless, a recent literature (with contributions by Kahneman, Wakker
and Sarin (1997), Oswald (1997), Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997), and
Ng (1997)) has argued forcefully that answers to questions about preferences can pro-
vide reliable and useful information. Thus, these answers should be taken as serious
evidence that the rich are more risk tolerant than the rest.
However, the table does not answer the question of the direction of causality between
risk preference and wealth. It is possible, as the preference heterogeneity story would
have it, that high risk tolerance leads to wealth, but it is equally possible that there is
causality from wealth to risk tolerance.
One piece of existing evidence that is suggestive of causality from wealth to risk
tolerance is the ﬁnding by Holtz-Eakin, Rosen, and Joulfaian (1994) that the receipt
of an inheritance substantially increases the probability that the recipient will start an
17Our method of identifying permanent income is simple: we restrict the sample to households who
reported that their income in the survey year was ‘about normal.’ Thus we are employing Friedman’s
original deﬁnition of permanent income, rather than modern deﬁnitions as the annuity value of human
and nonhuman wealth.
18entrepreneurial venture. Their interpretation is that because the inheritors presumably
knew that they would eventually inherit, their failure to start the entrepreneurial ven-
ture in advance of the receipt of the inheritance demonstrates the presence of liquidity
constraints. An alternative interpretation is that the increase in disposable wealth in-
creases the household’s risk tolerance enough for them to become willing to take the
risk of starting an entrepreneurial venture.18
The ideal experiment to answer the causality question would be to exogenously
dump a large amount of wealth on a random sample of households and examine the
eﬀect both on their expressed risk preferences and on their risk-taking behavior. The
closest approximation to this ideal experiment in an available dataset is the receipt of
unexpected inheritances between the 1983 and 1989 panels of the SCF.
Table 9 presents the results of a simple regression analysis of the change in risk
aversion between 1983 and 1989 on the size of inheritances received between the two
surveys, using the numerical answer to the survey question about risk attitudes as
the measure of risk aversion. That is, deﬁning RISKAV83 as the 1983 answer to the
risk aversion question and RISKAV89 as the 1989 answer, we deﬁne DRISKAV =
RISKAV89-RISKAV83 and regress DRISKAV on a measure of the size of inheritances
received and a set of control variables.19 Speciﬁcally, LINH is the log of the value
of inheritances, and the control variables in the weighted regression are the same as
the variables used by Gentry and Hubbard (1998) in their extensive investigation of
entrepreneurship using these data.
The coeﬃcient on LINH is overwhelmingly statistically signﬁcant and negative,
indicating that larger inheritances produce a greater decline in risk aversion. Recall
that the simple preference heterogeneity story was one in which individuals enter the
workforce with a built-in level of risk aversion which was unchanging through the
lifetime. If we interpret the RISKAV83 and RISKAV89 variables as measures of this
risk aversion, the results in Table 9 constitute a direct rejection of this story. Indeed,
almost half of households whose composition is unchanged report a diﬀerent value of
RISKAV89 than RISKAV83, and given that a large proportion of the change can be
explained ex post via regressions like that reported in Table 9, it is clear that these
changes do not merely reﬂect measurement error.
One potential problem with this experiment is that inheritances may be anticipated.
If so, the recipient might take the prospective inheritance into account in formulating
risk attitudes even before actual receipt. However, if this were true, a regression of the
18Note that capital market imperfections or uncertainty about the timing and/or size of the bequest
are still required; without either uncertainty or imperfections the household’s eﬀective wealth would
not change when a perfectly anticipated bequest was received.
19The sample is restricted to households whose composition did not change between the two survey
years, in order to ensure that changes in risk aversion really reﬂect changes in the attitudes of the
same individual(s).
19change in risk preferences on the size of inheritances received would ﬁnd a coeﬃcient
of zero, and so the fact that we found a highly signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient despite
this bias only strengthens the case that changes in wealth aﬀect risk aversion. Indeed,
when we restrict the sample (in column 2) to those households who said in 1983 that
they did not expect ever to receive a substantial inheritance (and who presumably were
surprised when they did), the coeﬃcient estimate is a bit larger (though the diﬀerence
is not statistically signiﬁcant).
Unfortunately, there is a more serious problem with the experiment: The survey
question cannot necessarily be interpreted as revealing the respondent’s underlying
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Instead, the question is about the respondent’s
willingness to bear ﬁnancial risk, and economic theory informs us that willingness
to bear ﬁnancial risk should depend upon a great many factors in addition to an
agent’s raw coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. In particular, what should matter is
the expected coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for the future period’s value function,
which may depend, for example, on whether the consumer anticipates possibly being
liquidity constrained in that future period. However, one conclusion from the recent
work on portfolio theory cited above is that the proportion of the portfolio invested in
the risky asset should decline in the level of current-period cash-on-hand. The reason
for this counterintuitive result is that when there is little ﬁnancial wealth, virtually all
of future consumption will be ﬁnanced by labor income, and so adding a small ﬁnancial
risk has very little eﬀect on overall consumption risk, so the agent is willing to invest
a large proportion of her modest portfolio in the risky ﬁnancial asset (this argument
relies on an implicit assumption that the correlation between ﬁnancial risk and labor
income risk is low, as Cocco et. al. (1998) show it is). As wealth grows large, however,
the proportion of future consumption to be ﬁnanced out of that wealth also grows large,
and thus willingness to bear additional ﬁnancial risk declines (see Cocco, Gomes, and
Maenhout (1998) for a fuller discussion of these issues). Thus, appropriately calibrated
portfolio theory implies that we would expect to see a declining willingness to bear
ﬁnancial risk as wealth increased, rather than the reverse as indicated in the table.
Many economists remain uncomfortable with using survey measures like the SCF
risk attitudes question. However, even if the results of Table 9 are set aside, there are
several other problems with the preference heterogeneity story as a complete explana-
tion for the observed pattern of facts.
In principle, the preference heterogeneity story can indeed explain the large share
of business equity in the portfolios of the richest households, under the assumption
that private business investments bear the highest risk and the highest return among
the categories of assets available. This assumption is plausible and therefore not prob-
lematic. However, several other features of the entrepreneurial investments of the rich
are problematic for this theory.
First, entrepreneurial investments of the rich are highly undiversiﬁed. If the rich
20are even slightly risk-averse, elementary portfolio theory under perfect capital markets
implies that the optimal strategy is to invest a tiny amount in each of a large number of
entrepreneurial ventures in order to diversify the idiosyncratic risk. Table 10 shows that
instead, among the rich households with any private business equity, over 80 percent of
that equity is in a single entreprenurial venture, while the three largest entreprenurial
investments account for 94 percent of entrepreneurial wealth (a similar pattern holds
for nonrich entrepreneurs). Furthermore, for rich entrepreneurial households, almost
half of all income comes directly from business enterprises in which the household has
an ownership stake. Failure of the business would wipe out not only the asset value
of the business, but also the business-derived income, and thus the total riskiniess of
business ownership is even greater than appears from the share of business equity in
total net worth. This means the incentive for diversiﬁcation is even stronger.
The next problem for the preference heterogeneity theory is that it provides no
explanation for the fact that the great majority of entrepreneurial wealth is in enter-
prises in which a member of the household has an active management role. Table 10
shows that 85 percent of all entrepreneurial wealth is held in such ‘actively managed’
businesses. Again, with perfect capital markets, management should be completely
detached from ownership to diversify idiosyncratic risk.
A ﬁnal problem is that the preference heterogeneity story provides no explanation
for the failure of the elderly rich to spend down their assets. Indeed, because risk toler-
ance is positively correlated with the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in models
with time-separable preferences, we should actually expect the rich to be running down
their wealth faster than the non-rich if the only diﬀerence in preferences between the
rich and non-rich is in their degree of risk tolerance.
Given that several of the preceding arguments imply that the preference heterogene-
ity story also requires some form of capital market imperfections in order to explain the
data, it is interesting to examine whether capital market imperfections by themselves
might do the trick.
The central requirement of any story based purely on capital market imperfections is
that business ownership must yield higher-than-market rates of return. Unfortunately,
the economics and business literatures do not appear to contain credible estimates
of the average rate of return on closely-held business ventures. Suppose for the mo-
ment that we accept on faith the proposition that closely-held business ventures earn
a higher rate of return (in exchange for higher risk) than is available on open capital
markets, and that such ventures must be substantially self-ﬁnanced for moral hazard
or adverse selection reasons. By themselves, and in the absence of preference hetero-
geneity, these assumptions cannot explain the positive correlation between the level of
initial labor income or initial wealth and the propensity to start businesses documented
by Quadrini (1999) and Gentry and Hubbard (1998). The problem is that these ar-
guments should apply with just as much force to very small business ventures (which
21can be ﬁnanced without large initial wealth or income) as to larger ones: As anyone
who has read the novel AConfederacy of Dunces knows, there are principal/agent and
moral hazard problems even for a hot dog vendor.
Gentry and Hubbard (1998) address this problem by simply assuming that there is a
minimum eﬃcient scale for business enterprises which is large relative to the resources of
the median household, but this approach is insuﬃcient to explain the data because the
richest households would have wealth vastly greater than any ﬁxed minimum eﬃcient
scale and therefore would have no need to tie up more than a trivial fraction of their
total net worth in any single business enterprise. Quadrini (1999) deals with this
problem by postulating a ‘ladder’ of business opportunities at ever-rising minimum
eﬃcient scales, so that no matter how rich the household becomes there is always an
opportunity to jump up to an even-higher rung on the ladder.
Even if we were to accept the story that there is a complicated ladder of minimum
eﬃcient scales of business operation al aQuadrini, the capital market imperfections
story still faces three problems. First, it provides no explanation for the failure of
the rich elderly eventually to begin running down their wealth. Second, if the risk
preferences of the rich were similar to those of the rest, the extra risk associated with
their entrepreneurial wealth should induce them to try to minimize the riskiness of
the remainder of their portfolio. However, Table 11 shows that the ﬁnancial asset
holdings of rich households who have a substantial fraction of their net worth tied up
in business equity are actually considerably riskier than the ﬁnancial asset holdings of
the rest of the population (although less risky than the ﬁnancial investments of the
rich nonentrepreneurs). Finally, the results in Table 8 strongly suggest that the rich,
whether entrepreneurs or nonentrepreneurs, are much more risk tolerant than the rest
of the population, and capital market imperfections alone can explain neither this nor
the ﬁnding in Table 9 that increases in wealth produce reductions in reported risk
aversion.
It is now time to consider whether the ‘capitalist spirit’ model can explain the
overall pattern of facts. Recall that this model assumed that bequests are a luxury
good, with the corollary implication that households are less risk averse with respect to
risks to their bequests than with respect to risks to their consumption. Since the luxury
good aspect of bequests implies that as a household becomes richer, it plans to devote
more and more of its resources to the bequest, the model also implies that risk aversion
declines in the level of wealth. Thus the capitalist spirit model is consistent with the
results on self-reported risk attitudes, as well as with the risky portfolio structure for
the rich, and with the evidence that receipt of inheritances reduces risk aversion (at
least if we assume that those inheritances were not perfectly anticipated). It also can
explain why higher income or higher net worth households are more likely to invest in
risky entrepreneurial ventures. Finally, it can explain the failure of the elderly rich to
run down their assets before death (indeed, this is the empirical fact that the model was
22developed to explain; its ability to explain the other empirical patterns documented
here was not anticipated in the original statement of the model).
However, if capital markets were perfect, rich households would still have every
incentive to diversify the idiosyncratic component of their entrepreneurial investments
by holding small shares of many entrepreneurial ventures. Their failure to do so is
presumably explained by capital market imperfections.20 Note, however, that one
attractive feature of a model which combines capital market imperfections with the
‘capitalist spirit’ utility function is that it is possible to dispense with the awkward
assumption of a ‘ladder’ of minimum eﬃcient scales which was necessary in the basic
model of capital market imperfections in order to explain the data. This makes the
analysis of such models considerably more tractable, transparent, and plausible.
4 Conclusions
The standard model of household behavior implies that the rich are just like scaled-up
versions of everybody else, including in their portfolio allocation patterns. The data
summarized in this paper contradict that assertion both for the US since 1963 and for
the other countries included in this survey.
The most important diﬀerences between the portfolios of the rich and the rest are
the much higher proportion of their assets that the rich hold in risky forms, and their
much higher propensity to be involved in entrepreneurial activities and to hold much
of their net worth in the form of their own entrepreneurial ventures. Several diﬀerent
features of the data point to a conclusion that relative risk aversion is a decreasing
function of wealth. Other features, particularly the concentration of the wealth of the
rich in their own entrepreneurial ventures, suggest that capital market imperfections are
also important. But it appears that most of the features of the data can be explained by
assuming both that bequests are a luxury good and that capital market imperfections
require entrepreneurial enterprises to be largely self-ﬁnanced and self-managed.
This is not to say that there could not also be exogenous diﬀerences in risk aversion
across households; just that the case does not appear to be strong that such diﬀerences
are necessary to explain the diﬀerences between the portfolios of the rich and the rest.
20In discussing this paper, Marco Pagano suggested that entrepreneurs may obtain utility directly
from the ownership and consequent control over their entrepreneurial ventures. This would lead to
a preferences-based theory of the nondiversiﬁcation of entrepreneurial investment. However, in order
to explain the overall pattern of facts, it would still be necessary to modify the utility function to
put wealth in the utility function in some form, since not all of the rich are entrepreneurs. Because
there is substantial independent evidence of capital market imperfections, it seems preferable to stick
with a story which explains the facts via an assumption of capital market imperfections plus a single
change in the utility function rather than with perfect capital markets plus two changes in the utility
function.
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26Table 1: Major Features of the Tax Code Relevant for the Rich
















1963 91% 24.6% 3-77% $268,581 NA 50% $13,429
3
1977 70% 27.8% 18-70% $295,971 $1,226,400 50% or $613,200 $7,358
1980 70% 23.9% 18-70% $312,071 $965,790 50% or $482,895 $5,794
1985 50% 19.2% 18-55% $596,848 $1,119,090 100% $14,921
1989 28% 20.4% 18-55% $784,896 $981,120 100% $13,081
1993 39.6% 21.9% 18-55% $686,784 $858,480 100% $11,446
1995 39.6% 23.8% 18-55% $649,992 $812,490 100% $10,833
1998 39.6% NA 18-55% $638,750 $766,500
4 100% $10,220
5
All dollar figures converted to 1999 dollars using the CPI All Urban, All Items Research Series.  The
adjustment factors used are 4.40, 2.42, 1.91, 1.48, 1.30, 1.14, 1.08,  and 1.02 for 1963, 1977, 1980, 1985,
1989, 1993, 1995,  and 1998.
1The effective tax rate is the effective individual income tax rate.  This is calculated by dividing individual
income tax by total income.
2The annual exclusion is per donee.
3Since 1977 the gift tax range has been the same as the estate tax range.  Prior to 1977 the gift tax range
was 2.25-57.75%.
4Starting in 1998 the estate tax exemption increases yearly to 1 million dollars in 2006 and the exclusion for
closely held business is indexed for inflation.
5Starting in 1998 the annual exclusion is indexed for inflation.
Sources:
For marginal and eﬀective rates prior to 1980, see Brownlee (2000). For marginal rates
from 1980-1998, see Booth (1998) in the references. For eﬀective rates from 1980-93, see
Slemrod (1994). For eﬀective rates for 1995, see Kasten, Sammartino, and Weiner (1998).
For estate and gift tax information, see Johnson and Eller (1998) and Joulfaian (1998).
27Table 2: Ownership Rates of Assets and Liabilities
Top 1 Percent of Households By Net Worth Top 1% 0-99%
1962 1983 1989 1992 1995 1962-95 1962-95
Financial Assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 91.7
Transaction and savings accts 91.6 99.6 100.0 100.0 99.9 98.2 84.6
Certificates of deposit na 38.7 32.7 31.5 24.6 31.9 14.0
US Savings bonds 36.7 23.2 18.1 18.9 28.0 25.0 23.3
Federal, state and local bonds 30.7 45.1 41.2 38.3 29.9 37.0 2.4
Other bonds 30.3 9.6 16.2 21.2 12.8 18.0 1.7
Stocks 84.0 79.9 72.5 69.7 65.0 74.2 16.3
Mutual funds 24.0 33.8 39.1 46.0 45.0 37.6 7.5
Defined contribution pensions 10.1 65.6 71.3 76.1 78.6 60.4 28.7
Defined benefit pensions na 24.3 13.7 20.1 10.6 17.2 20.3
Cash value of life insurance 59.6 71.6 64.5 57.8 60.0 62.7 37.0
Other managed assets 13.4 24.9 27.5 17.4 17.7 20.2 3.4
Other financial assets 89.3 10.1 31.9 31.1 25.2 37.5 27.2
Non-financial Assets 96.7 100.0 99.3 100.0 99.8 99.2 89.3
Primary residence 74.1 96.6 86.0 93.5 96.0 89.2 62.2
Vehicles 77.7 91.4 90.6 97.8 89.5 89.4 82.5
Investment Real Estate 44.0 74.2 76.6 75.4 61.3 66.3 16.3
Privately held businesses 69.0 88.0 73.4 69.7 74.3 74.9 12.8
Other non-financial assets 50.8 30.7 57.1 54.6 46.1 47.9 11.2
Debt 50.2 77.9 77.3 80.3 70.5 71.2 71.5
Mortgage  30.7 54.5 35.8 53.4 52.5 45.4 37.6
Other real estate debt 12.8 45.2 48.3 53.6 35.1 39.0 6.6
Student loans na na 0.7 0.1 0.9 0.6 6.3
Other installment loans 20.7 35.0 19.5 21.9 12.6 21.9 46.9
Credit cards na 9.6 14.8 17.0 12.2 13.4 33.8
Other debt 17.6 15.2 20.2 30.8 17.2 20.2 9.4
Source: Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers and Surveys of Cosumer Finances
Note:  Cells with an "na" indicate asset or debt categories not disaggregated in a particular survey year
Definitions of assets and debts
Transaction and savings accounts include checking, saving, money market, and call accounts.
Federal, state, and local bonds include government bonds (not US Savings bonds) and municipal bonds.  
Other bonds include mortgage, corporate, foreign, and other types of bonds.
Defined contribution pensions include employer-sponsored plans and personal retirement accounts.
Cash value of life insurance refers to the cash value of whole life policies.
Other managed assets consists of trusts, annuities and managed investment accounts.  
Other financial assets consist royalties, future proceeds from lawsuits, oil, gas, and mineral leases, etc.
Other non-financial assets include such items as artwork, jewelry, etc.
Businesses include those in which the household has an active and/or passive interest.  
Mortgage debt includes any borrowing on home equity lines of credit.
Installment loans consists of vehicle loans, home improvement loans (not home equity loans), and other loans.
Other debt includes other lines of credit, loans against pensions, loans against life insurance policies, margin loans, etc.
Averages
28Table 3: Composition of Net Worth
Top 1 Percent of Households By Net Worth Top 1% 0-99%
1962 1983 1989 1992 1995 1962-95 1962-95
Financial Assets/Net Worth 57.436.6 32.0 32.0 4 0.8 39.7 36.4
As a fraction of total financial assets
Transaction and savings accts 6.5 7.6 18.4 14.6 14.6 12.3 22.4
Certificates of deposit na 2.3 3.9 2.5 2.7 2.9 9.4
US Savings bonds 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 2.8
Federal, state and local bonds 7.3 12.4 12.8 13.4 11.5 11.5 3.7
Other bonds 1.2 0.5 4.0 3.1 2.1 2.2 1.0
Stocks 53.6 39.9 23.2 30.8 26.5 34.8 15.2
Mutual funds 3.4 3.1 7.0 7.6 15.7 7.4 6.6
Defined contribution pensions 0.6 5.8 9.2 13.0 12.7 8.3 19.4
Cash value of life insurance 4.9 3.0 3.5 1.7 3.7 3.4 11.8
Other managed assets 21.5 24.5 12.6 8.0 7.9 14.9 4.8
Other financial assets 0.0 0.7 5.1 4.9 2.3 2.6 2.8
Nonfinancial Assets/Net Worth 46.6 69.4 76.8 74.9 64.3 66.4 86.7
As a fraction of Net Worth
Primary residence 5.2 7.8 7.8 8.9 7.1 7.4 49.6
Vehicles 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 6.3
Investment real estate 7.2 16.8 25.6 23.0 11.9 16.9 13.1
Net value of private businesses 30.6 39.3 38.5 39.0 41.4 37.7 14.8
Other non-financial assets 3.2 5.2 4.0 3.3 3.3 3.8 2.9
Debt/Net Worth 4.0 6.0 8.7 6.9 5.1 6.1 23.1
As a Fraction of Net Worth
Mortgage  0.6 0.8 0.9 1.6 1.6 1.1 15.5
Other real estate debt 1.5 3.1 6.7 4.4 2.6 3.7 3.2
Student loans na na 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Other installment loans 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 3.1
Credit cards na 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
Other debt 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.5
Memo items
Median net worth (th '98 $) 1,841 4,291 4,720 4,138 4,748 3,948 51
Avg net worth (th '98 $) 3,044 7,156 7,185 6,399 7,854 6,328 133
Median wealth to income ratio 15.4 14.9 18.8 20.8 20.0 18.0 1.5
Avg wealth to income ratio 18.5 27.4 33.0 35.7 38.6 30.6 8.7
Source: Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers and Surveys of Consumer Finances
Note:  Cells with an "na" indicate asset or debt categories not disaggregated in a particular survey year
Averages
29Table 4: Composition of Net Worth by Risk Category
Top 1 Percent of Households By Net Worth Top 1% 0-99%
1962 1983 1989 1992 1995 1962-95 1962-95
Financial Assets/Net Worth 57.436.6 32.0 32.0 4 0.8 39.7 36.4
As a fraction of Financial Assets
Safe 17.9 30.7 47.6 43.9 44.7 37.0 64.1
  Clearly safe 7.5 10.2 22.6 17.5 17.5 15.1 34.7
  Fairly safe 10.4 20.5 25.0 26.5 27.2 21.9 29.5
Risky 82.1 69.3 52.4 56.1 55.3 63.0 35.9
As a fraction of Net Worth
Nonfinancial Assets 46.6 69.4 76.8 74.9 64.3 66.4 86.7
Primary residence 5.2 7.8 7.8 8.9 7.1 7.4 49.6
Investment real estate 7.2 16.8 25.6 23.0 11.9 16.9 13.1
Business equity 30.6 39.3 38.5 39.0 41.4 37.7 14.8
Other non-financial assets 3.6 5.5 4.8 4.0 4.0 4.4 9.2
Debt 4.0 6.0 8.7 6.9 5.1 6.1 23.1
Mortgage 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.6 1.6 1.1 15.5
Other Secured 2.3 3.2 6.9 4.7 2.9 4.0 8.9
Unsecured 0.7 2.1 0.9 0.6 0.5 1.0 2.5
Memo:
Risky assets – narrow 30.8 14.6 7.4 9.8 10.8 14.7 5.4
Risky assets – broad 84.9 81.4 80.8 80.0 75.8 80.6 41.2
Risky assets – broadest 90.9 88.9 88.8 88.4 86.9 88.8 52.0
Mortgage debt / total debt 14.1 12.8 10.6 22.6 31.8 18.4 66.6
Definitions of asset and debt classifications:
Risky assets - narrow consists of direct stock holdings
Risky assets - broad consists of risky financial assets, plus the net value of businesses and investment real estate
Risky assets - broadest consists of all assets in the broad definition and probably safe assets
Secured debt includes  vehicle loans, loans against pensions and life insurance policies,  investment real estate debt, and call account debt.
Unsecured debt includes credit card balances, installment loans, other lines of credit, and other debt.
†Definitions of the risky and 'fairly safe' components of mutual funds and defined contribution pensions follow below.
Sources: Calculations by the author using the Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers and Surveys of Consumer Finances
Averages
Fairly safe includes state/local bonds, the fairly safe component of mutual funds
†, the fairly safe component of defined contribution 
pensions
†, and the cash value of life insurance policies.
Risky includes stocks, bonds (all types but state/local and US Savings), other managed assets, other financial assets, and the risky 
component of mutual funds and defined contribution pension accounts.
Clearly safe includes transaction accounts (checking, saving, money market, and call accounts), certificates of deposit, and US 
Savings bonds
30Calculations of fairly risky and fairly safe mutual funds and deﬁned contribution
pensions in Table 4 are as follows.
1962 SFCC Due to the lack of information on mutual fund investment strategies, all mutual
funds are classiﬁed as risky and all deﬁned contribution pensions are classiﬁed as
safe.
1983 SCF The 1983 SCF did not ask about the investment strategy or risk characteristics
of mutual funds or retirement accounts, so we had to make educated guesses
based on other information. Tax-free mutual funds were allotted to the ’fairly
safe’ category because such funds consist almost exclusively of state and local
government bonds, direct holdings of which we put in this category. Taxable
mutual funds were allotted to the ’risky’ category, because in the early 1980s these
funds typically contained a mix of stocks and bonds. The calculation of risky and
fairly safe, and clearly safe deﬁned contribution pensions uses the institution that
held the IRA/Keogh accounts as a proxy for investment direction. If a real estate
investment company held the accounts, then those deﬁned contribution pensions
were considered risky. If a commercial bank, savings and loan, or credit union
held the accounts, then those assets were considered fairly safe. If a brokerage,
insurance company, employer, school/college/university, investment management
company, or the AARP held the accounts, the deﬁned contribution pensions were
split 50/50 between the fairly safe and risky. In the case that the household
had no IRA/Keogh accounts, but had a thrift pension account, the assets were
considered fairly safe.
1989-1995 SCF These surveys asked about the investment strategy for mutual funds and retire-
ment accounts. Funds and accounts that consisted exclusively of one category of
asset (such as stock or bond mutual funds) we allocated in the same way that we
allocated direct holdings of that asset type. Mutual funds and accounts that con-
tained a mix of stocks and bonds were allocated half-and-half to the ’fairly safe’
and ’risky’ categories. Accounts invested in real estate, commodities or limited
partnerships were put in the ‘risky’ category.
31Table 5: Degree of Diversiﬁcation of Portfolio Structure
Asset Combinations 1962 1983 1989 1992 1995
CS FS R
0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0 0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0 1 0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
0 1 1 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 0 0 0.0 2.5 1.6 6.5 2.4
1 0 1 4.4 1.6 10.8 5.1 9.4
1 1 0 10.9 12.8 9.1 9.4 10.7
1 1 1 81.8 83.2 78.5 78.9 77.4
Notes:
CS denotes clearly safe financial assets
FS denotes fairly safe financial assets
R denotes risky financial assets
0 denotes no ownership of assets in the specified category; 1 denotes ownership.
Note: A description of the asset classiﬁcations appears in the notes at the end of Table 4.
Source: Author’s calculations using the Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers and Surveys
of Consumer Finances
32Table 6: Risk Bearing By Age
Age of Household Head
Survey < 30 30-3940-4950-5960-69 > 70
1962 SFCC
Risky fin asset ownership 81.4 93.0 90.7 71.4 79.8 97.9
Risky fin asset / fin assets 85.5 96.7 73.7 83.1 75.1 77.5
Broad risky asset ownership 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Broad risky asset / total assets 78.8 92.2 80.4 84.2 76.9 74.9
1983 SCF
Risky fin asset ownership 47.4 72.6 65.3 96.9 100.0 84.0
Risky fin asset / fin assets 74.2 57.6 86.9 78.3 68.0 65.8
Broad risky asset ownership 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Broad risky asset / total assets 67.8 74.9 87.8 85.2 72.1 74.8
1989 SCF
Risky fin asset ownership 60.1 73.8 89.1 89.9 92.3 95.2
Risky fin asset / fin assets 92.5 47.3 61.6 51.2 51.0 51.8
Broad risky asset ownership 100.0 100.0 95.5 100.0 100.0 99.3
Broad risky asset / total assets 91.8 58.7 78.8 80.1 80.2 70.9
1992 SCF
Risky fin asset ownership 64.1 89.0 77.2 89.5 88.1 84.3
Risky fin asset / fin assets 65.1 52.9 48.4 61.0 58.8 58.8
Broad risky asset ownership 92.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Broad risky asset / total assets 76.4 72.7 79.0 75.6 78.9 73.6
1995 SCF
Risky fin asset ownership 88.2 73.6 87.3 75.5 87.2 89.7
Risky fin asset / fin assets 27.2 60.1 59.1 50.7 51.2 57.9
Broad risky asset ownership 91.3 97.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Broad risky asset / total assets 41.8 67.5 78.8 74.2 68.4 70.7
1962-1995
Risky fin asset ownership 68.2 80.4 81.9 84.6 89.5 90.2
Risky fin asset / fin assets 68.9 62.9 65.9 64.9 60.8 62.3
Broad risky asset ownership 96.7 99.5 99.1 100.0 100.0 99.9
Broad risky asset / total assets 71.3 73.2 81.0 79.9 75.3 73.0
Notes: The deﬁnition of risky ﬁnancial assets corresponds to the sum of clearly risky
and fairly risky assets deﬁned in Table 4. The deﬁnition of broad risky assets corre-
sponds to the ‘risky assets - broad’ classiﬁcation in Table 4.
Source: Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers and Surveys of Consumer
Finances
33Table 7: International Comparisons
US - 1995 Netherlands - 1995 Italy - 1995 Germany - 1993
Top 5% Bot 95% Top 5% Bot 95% Top 5% Bot 95% Top 5% Bot 95% Top 5% Bot 95%
Gross Financial Assets (GFA) per HH $1,120,583 $41,118 278,778 21,138 122,507 17,286 155,623 28,022 175,427 10,720
As a ratio to Gross Financial Assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Safe 37.0 54.1 21.8 47.8 52.7 81.2 68.3 79.5 54.5 77.2
  Clearly safe 17.9 27.6 14.8 45.2 46.2 69.7 11.3 27.0 46.3 70.8
  Fairly safe 19.2 26.5 7.0 2.6 6.5 11.5 57.0 52.5 8.2 6.4
Risky 50.7 29.9 52.9 14.3 30.6 9.2 19.7 10.0 25.1 15.0
   Clearly risky 44.6 27.4 NA NA 13.9 2.1 12.0 4.0 17.1 12.9
   Fairly risky 6.1 2.4 NA NA 16.7 7.1 7.6 6.0 8.8 2.0
Risk Characteristics Unknown 12.3 16.0 25.3 37.9 16.7 9.6 12.0 10.4 19.6 7.8
Nonfinancial Assets per HH $1,626,405 $98,423 432,098 34,539 905,204 112,588 661,115 96,306 -- --
As a ratio to Net Worth 63.1 95.5 69.4 116.0 88.1 86.7 -- -- -- --
Gross value of primary residence 12.7 65.7 31.9 98.5 29.2 53.7 88.0 86.0 -- --
Net value of private business 32.0 6.5 19.1 3.1 37.0 15.6 -- -- -- --
Gross value investment real estate 13.5 9.9 16.8 4.2 16.0 5.5 -- -- -- --
Gross value of durables, of which -- -- -- -- 3.7 10.1 -- -- -- --
  Vehicles 1.3 10.8 1.7 10.1 2.6 7.3 -- -- -- --
Other non-financial assets 3.6 2.7 NA NA 2.1 1.8 -- -- -- --
Debt per HH $169,454 $36,479 75,240 16,197 27,319 4,753 65,382 15,111 -- --
As a ratio to Net Worth 6.6 35.4 14.1 51.5 2.7 3.7 8.7 16.4 -- --
Mortgage on primary residence 3.0 25.7 12.4 45.6 0.6 2.2 -- -- -- --
Other secured debt 3.1 5.9 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Unsecured debt 0.5 3.8 1.7 5.4 -- -- 0.4 1.8 -- --
Net Worth per HH $2,577,534 $103,063 622,933 29,779 1,027,711 129,874 750,592 91,987 -- --
Memo:
Clearly Risky Financial Assets/GFA 44.6 27.4 NA NA 13.9 2.1 12.0 4.0 -- --
Broad Risky Assets/GFA 155.3 71.0 20.8 3.4 475.8 167.6 19.7 10.0 -- --
Very Broad Risky Assets/GFA 174.5 97.5 52.2 8.2 482.3 179.1 76.7 62.5 -- --
Total Household Income  $216,142 $39,685 59,958 19,924 64,012 22,732 80,655 35,647 -- --
Total Household Noncapital Income $135,864 $37,985 NA NA 56,035 21,864 59,873 32,306 -- --
Notes:
Definitions Common to All Countries
UK - 1997/98
Households are sorted once, by the broadest measure of net worth available, to determine their classification into top 5 or bottom 95 percent.  Asset shares are computed as ratio of 
averages. All statistics use sample weights.Definitions for United States
Data are drawn from the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances.  Figures are reported in 1999 dollars, converted from 1995 numbers using the CPI-U-RS.
Definitions of financial asset classifications:
Clearly safe includes transaction accounts (checking, saving, money market), certificates of deposit, US Savings bonds, and mutual funds invested exclusively in these assets
Fairly safe includes state/local bonds, mutual funds, and other managed assets invested in state/local bonds, and the cash value of life insurance policies.
Fairly risky includes bonds (all types except state/local and US Savings) and mutual funds invested in bonds (all types except state/local and US Savings)
Clearly risky includes stocks and financial assets invested in real estate, commodities, and private partnerships
Mutual funds and retirement accounts which are invested in a single category of assets (for example, 100 percent stock mutual funds) are included in the corresponding category
Other secured debt includes call account debt, vehicle loans, loans against pensions and life insurance policies and loans for investment real estate
Unsecured debt includes credit card balances, installment loans, other lines of credit, and other misc. debts
Broad Risky Assets - consists of clearly risky and fairly risky financial assets, plus businesses and investment real estate
Very Broad Risky Assets -  consists of broad risky assets plus fairly safe assets
Total Household Income includes all income to the household from any source.
Total Noncapital Income subtracts all capital income (dividends, interest, capital gains, etc.) from Total Household Income
Definitions for the Netherlands
Data are drawn from the 1995 CentER Savings Survey.  For further information see the Netherlands country chapter.
1998 guilder are converted to Euros using the rate 1 Euro = 2.203 guilders.
Clearly safe - transactions and savings accounts and certificates of deposit.
Clearly risky - Stocks, bonds, mutual funds
Risk characteristics unknown - The largest items are defined contribution pension plans, cash value of life insurance, and employer-sponsored pension plans.
Risk characteristics unknown.  The three largest components of this category are mutual funds whose investment direction is unknown, retirement accounts whose investment 
direction is unknown, and other managed assets whose investment direction is unknown.  'Other financial assets' are also included in this category.Definitions for Italy
Data are drawn from the 1995 Survey of Household Income and Wealth, described in the Italy country chapter.
Clearly safe includes currency, transaction accounts (checking, saving, and postal accounts), certificates of deposit and short-term Treasury Bills.
Fairly safe includes the cash value of life insurance policies.
Fairly risky includes bonds (all types except short-term government bills), mutual funds and managed investment accounts.
Clearly risky includes only stocks.
Risk characteristics unknown: mutual funds and defined contribution pension funds.
Mortgage debt includes all mortgage debt, not just the primary residence.
Durables do not include art objects, jewelry, etc.
Broad Risky Assets - consists of clearly risky and fairly risky financial assets, plus businesses and investment real estate
Very Broad Risky Assets -  consists of broad risky assets plus fairly safe assets
Definitions for Germany
1993 DM are converted to 1999 DM using the CPI index 1 DM (December 1999) = 1.054878 DM (1993), and then to Euros by the fixed rate of 1.95583 DM = 1 Euro.
Fairly risky includes other bonds and mutual funds invested in stocks or bonds
Clearly risky includes stocks and mutual funds invested in real estate
Risk characteristics unknown  - "Other" financial assets.
Non-financial assets - no data are available separating real estate into personal residence and other, so the number for personal residence reflects all real estate
Definitions for UK
Data are drawn from the 1997-98 Financial Research Survey - see UK country chapter for details.
Figures were calculated in 1997 pounds, converted to 1999 pounds using the CPI inflation factor of 1.0726, then converted to Euros using the 1999 Euro/pound exchange rate of 1.7.
Fairly safe includes government and local bonds, plus National Savings Bonds.
Fairly risky includes all bonds (all types except government/local and National savings) 
Clearly risky stocks and shares
Other secured debt includes call account debt, vehicle loans, loans against pensions and life insurance policies and loans for investment real estate
Secured and unsecured debt includes installment loans, other lines of credit, and other misc. debts,  agreed overdrafts and vehicle or other secured loans 
Clearly safe includes transaction accounts (checking, saving, money market), certificates of deposit, National Savings current accounts, Premium bonds 
and TESSAs. 
Risk characteristics unknown.  This is almost entirely mutual funds where investment direction is unknown and retirement accounts whose investment direction is 
unknown; 'Other financial assets' are also included in this category.
Value of pension and life insurance assets not known in survey and hence not included in definition of gross financial assets, or in any 
subcomponent. 
Fairly safe includes the cash value of endowment life insurance, assets accumulated in building society savings contracts (Bausparverträge), municipal bonds, savings certificates, and 
government bonds
All values are expressed in Euro, obtained by converting 1995 Lire to 1999 Lire using the increase in the CPI from 1995 to 1999 (10.8 percent) and converting to Euros using the 1999 
fixed exchange rate between Euros and Lire, 1 Euro= 1.936 Lire.
Data are drawn from the Income and Expenditure Survey wave 1993 covering 31,774 West German households and 8456 East German households, 80% subsample, excluding 
households with total net monthly income of 35,000DM(1993) or more.  The data set is described in detail in the appendix to the German country study.Table 8: Risk Aversion By Income and Net Worth, 1992 and 95 SCFs
Survey Year 1992 1995
Mean %N oR i s k Mean %N oR i s k
Permanent Income Percentiles
99-100 2.5 3.8 2.6 6.2
80-98.9 2.8 16.9 2.8 16.1
0-79.9 3.3 48.7 3.2 40.1
Net Worth Percentiles
99-100 2.6 11.5 2.5 6.5
80-98.9 2.9 21.6 2.8 17.6
0-79.9 3.3 48.4 3.2 43.8
Notes: The table summarizes answers to the following question: “Which of the statements on this page
comes closest to the amount of ﬁnancial riskthat you (and your spouse/partner) are willing to tak e
when you save or make investments? 1. Take sustantial ﬁnancial risks expecting to earn substantial
returns; 2. Take above average ﬁnancial risks expecting to earn above average returns; 3. Take average
ﬁnancial risks expecting to earn average returns; 4. Not willing to take any ﬁnancial risks. To tabulate
results by ‘permanent income’ percentile, the sample was restricted to those households who said that
their income in the survey year was ‘about normal,’ and permanent income was deﬁned as observed
income for such households.











KIDS -0.005  0.002 
(0.036) (0.064)


















EDUC 0.014  0.012 
(0.012) (0.014)
CONSTANT 1.730  1.848 
(0.290) (0.348)
Number of Obs 491 357
R-Squared 0.132 0.159
Notes: Dependent variable DRISKAV is the change in attitude toward ﬁnancial risk for the
household between 1983 and 1989, as described in the text. A negative change implies a reduction in
risk aversion. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗denotes signiﬁcance at the 90 percent level; ∗∗denotes
signiﬁcance at the 95 percent level; ∗∗∗denotes signiﬁcance at the 99 percent level. The ﬁrst column
(”All Recipients”) reports results including all households who received an inheritance between 1983
and 1989. The second column (”Surprised”) includes all households who received an inheritance
between 1983 and 1989 but reported in 1983 that they did not expect ever to receive a substantial
inheritance. The regression speciﬁcation follows Gentry and Hubbard’s baseline speciﬁcation. Variable
deﬁnitions:
LINH Log of total value of inheritances received between 1983 and 1989
MARRIED Dummy variable for hh head married in 1989
KIDS Number of kids under 18 in the household in 1983
A2Age dummy, hh head between 35 and 54 in 1983
A3 Age dummy, hh head at least 55 in 1983
UNEMP83 Dummy variable for hh head unemployed in 1983 and employed in 1989
UNEMP89 Dummy variable for hh head employed in 1983 and unemployed in 1989
OWNHOME Dummy variable for hh being a homeowner in 1983
EDUC HH head years of education in 1989
38Table 10: Lack of Diversiﬁcation of Business Wealth
Percent of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Largest Businesses in Total Business Equity
and Aggregate Ratio of Business Derived Income to Total Income, for 
Households Owing Some Business Equity, by Net Worth Percentile, 1995 SCF
Percentile
All HHs 0-99% 99-100%
Value of Business
Largest 0.88 0.89 0.82
2 Largest 0.92 0.92 0.92
3 Largest 0.92 0.92 0.94
'Actively Managed' Business Assets  0.89 0.89 0.85
Ratio to Total Income:
Business Income 0.32 0.28 0.38
Business Derived Income 0.58 0.66 0.44
Notes:
Value in cells in the first four rows is the mean ratio of the value of the business(es) to 
total business equity.
Business income is the income the household reported receiving 
from all the businesses the household owns, regardless of whether 
anyone in the household works in any of the businesses.
Source: Calculations by author using the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances
Business derived income consists of wages and salaries paid by the business to the 
household head or spouse plus retained earnings reported by the head or spouse from 
a business the household owns.
39Table 11: Riskiness of Financial Assets in Entrepreneurs’ Portfolios
Average Portfolio Allocations for Business Owners and Nonowners, 1995 SCF
Top 1% 0-99%
Bus=0 0<Bus<33 33<Bus<100 Bus=0 0<Bus<33 33<Bus<100
Financial Assets/Net Worth 77.3 59.0 16.9 41.5 36.0 18.2
As a Percent of Financial Assets As a Percent of Financial Assets
Safe 37.0 55.3 58.4 76.1 68.2 81.1
  Clearly safe 13.0 18.8 26.7 47.5 37.0 55.3
  Fairly safe 24.1 36.5 31.7 28.6 31.2 25.8
Risky 63.0 44.7 41.5 24.0 31.8 18.9
Notes:
Only households with ≥ $1000 in net worth are included in this table.
BUS is deﬁned as the ratio of noncorporate business equity to total net worth. Deﬁni-
tions of ﬁnancial assets, safe, and risky assets are as in previous tables.
Source: Calculations by the author using the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances














Figure 1: Wealth Proﬁles for Baseline and More Patient Households
Source: Reproduced from Carroll (2000)
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Figure 2: Age Proﬁle of Log Wealth for the 99th Percentile, SCF Data
Source: Reproduced from Carroll (2000)
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